

PUBLICATION CURRICULUM VITAE

KIRK LUDWIG
PROFESSOR & CHAIR

Philosophy Department, Cognitive Science Program, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405-7005
ludwig@indiana.edu | (812) 855-2404 (office) | (352) 214-5357 (mobile) | kirk ludwig.net

EDUCATION:

Ph.D. University of California, Berkeley, Philosophy, June 1990.
B.S. University of California, Santa Barbara, Physics, 1981, *Summa Cum Laude*.

AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION:

Philosophy of Mind and Action, Philosophy of Language, Epistemology, Metaphysics.

ACADEMIC EMPLOYMENT:

Professor, Department of Philosophy, Cognitive Science Program, Indiana University, August 2010-.
Colonel Alan R. and Margaret G. Crow CLAS Term Professor, August 2008-July 2010.
Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Florida, June 2005 – July 2008.
Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Florida, June 1995 – May 2005.
Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Florida, August 1990 - May 1995.

PUBLICATIONS BY YEAR:

2019

1. “Individual and Collective Action: Reply to Blomberg,” forthcoming in the *Journal of Social Ontology*.
2. "Collective Intentionality" Oxford Bibliographies Online, with Marija Jankovic, in press.
3. “What are Group Speech Acts?” forthcoming in a special issue of *Language and Communication* on Group Speech Acts, eds. Leo Townsend, Bernhard Schmid, Michael Schmitz.
4. “Triangulating on Thought and Norms,” forthcoming in *Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review*, in a print symposium on *Donald Davidson's Triangulation Argument*, Robert Myers and Claudine Verheggen.
5. “From Individual to Collective Responsibility: There and Back Again,” forthcoming in *The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility*, eds. Saba Bazargan-Forward and Deborah Tollefsen, 2019.
6. “Unconscious Inference Theories of Cognitive Achievement,” in press, in *Inference and Consciousness*, eds. Timothy Chan and Anders Nes, Routledge, 2019.
7. “What is Minimal Cooperation?” in press, in *Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency*, ed. Anika Fiebich, Springer, 2019.
8. “The Truth about Vagueness,” with Greg Ray, in press, in *On the Sorites Paradox*, eds. Ali Abasnezhad and Otavio Bueno, Springer, 2019.

2018

9. *The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality*, (ed.) with Marija Jankovic, 2018, New York: Routledge.
10. "Proxy Assertion," in press, in *The Oxford Handbook of Assertion*, ed. Sanford Goldberg, Oxford University Press, 2018.
11. "Actions and Events in Plural Discourse," in *Routledge Handbook on Collective Intentionality*, eds. Marija Jankovic and Kirk Ludwig, Routledge, 2018.
12. "Proxy Agency," in *The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality*, ed. Marija Jankovic and Kirk Ludwig, Routledge, 2018.

2017

13. *From Plural to Institutional Agency: Collective Action 2*, 2017, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
14. "Truth-Theoretic Semantics and Its Limits," *Argumenta*, special issue on the centenary of Donald Davidson's birth, ed. by Mario De Caro and Cristina Amoretti, (Nov.) 2017 3(1): 22-38.
15. "Unity in the Variety of Quotation," with Greg Ray, in *Semantic and Pragmatic Aspects of Quotation*, eds. Paul Saka and Michael Johnson, Springer, 2017.
16. "Fission, First Person Thought, and Subject-body Dualism," *European Journal of Analytic Philosophy* 2017 13(1): 5-25.
17. "Thought Experiments in Experimental Philosophy," in the *Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments*, eds. Mike Stuart and James Brown, Routledge, 2017.
18. "Plural Action Sentences and Logical Form: Reply to Himmelreich," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 2017 95(4): 800-806.
19. "Do Corporations Have Minds of Their Own?" special issue of *Philosophical Psychology* on Collective Intentionality and Socially Extended Minds, eds. Mattia Galloti and Bryce Huebner, 30(3): 265-297.
20. "Methodological Individualism, the We-mode, and Team Reasoning," in *Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality: Critical Essays on The Philosophy of Raimo Tuomela with His Responses*, Springer, 2017.
21. "Collective Intentionality," with Marija Jankovic, *Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, ed. Lee McIntyre, Routledge, 2017.

2016

22. *From Individual to Plural Agency: Collective Action 1*, 2016, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
23. "Corporate Speech in *Citizens United* vs. *Federal Election Commission*," *SpazioFilosofico: Agency*, vol. 16, February 2016. URL: <http://www.spaziofilosofico.it/numero-16/6059/corporate-speech-in-citizens-united-vs-federal-election-commission/>

2015

24. "What are Conditional Intentions?" in *Method: Analytic Perspectives* 2015, 4(6): 30-60.
25. "Reply to Ferrero," in *Method: Analytic Perspectives* 2015, 4(6): 75-86.
26. "Is Distributed Cognition Group Level Cognition," *The Journal of Social Ontology* 2015, 1(2): 189-224.
27. "Shared Agency in Modest Sociality," in a symposium on Michael Bratman's book *Shared Agency*, *The Journal of Social Ontology*, 2015, 1(1): 7-15
28. "Was Davidson's Project a Carnapian Explication of Meaning?" *The Journal of the History of Analytic Philosophy*, 2015 4(3) (DOI:<http://dx.doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v3i4.46>).

29. "The Sources of Relativism," review essay on Carol Rovane's *The Metaphysics and Ethics of Relativism*, *Ethics* 2015, 126(1):175-195.
30. "What is this Thing Called Perception: Review of John Searle, *Seeing Things as They Are*," *The Philosophers' Magazine*, Third Quarter 2015, issue 70, 114-6.

2014

31. "The Ontology of Collective Action," in *From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays*, eds. S. Chant, F. Hindriks and G. Preyer, Oxford University Press, 2014.
32. "Proxy Agency in Collective Action," *Nous*, 2014, 48(1): 75-105 (first published online 6 FEB 2013 DOI: 10.1111/nous.12013).
33. "Propositions and Higher-order Attitude Attributions," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* supplementary volume on the nature of propositions, eds. David Hunter and Gurpreet Rattan 43(5-6) (2013) (first published online March 2014, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2013.891688>).
34. "Review: *Donald Davidson: A Short Introduction*, by Kathrin Glüer," *Dialectica* 68(3) (September 2014): 464-473.

2013

35. *Companion to Donald Davidson*, (ed.) with Ernie Lepore, New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013.
36. "Truth in the Theory of Meaning" with Ernie Lepore, in *Companion to Donald Davidson*, Wiley-Blackwell, 2013.
37. "Methods in Analytic Epistemology," in *Philosophical Methodology*, ed. Matthew Haug, Routledge, 2013.
38. "Review Essay: Scott Soames, *Philosophy of Language*." *Philosophia*, 41(3) (September 2013): pp. 905-916 (DOI: 10.1007/s11406-013-9447-0)
39. "Collective Agents," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences*, ed. Byron Kaldis, Sage Publications, 2013.
40. Donald Davidson, Oxford Bibliographies Online, <http://www.oxfordbibliographiesonline.com/> (last updated June 2015).
41. "Introduction," with E. Lepore, *A Companion to Donald Davidson*, Wiley-Blackwell, 2013.

2012

42. "The Argument for Subject-Body Dualism from Transtemporal-identity," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 2013, 86(3): 684-701, published online 25 July 2012, DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00599.x.
43. "Logical Form," in *The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language*, eds. Gillian Russell and Delia Graff, Routledge, 2012.
44. "What Role Should Propositions Have in the Theory of Meaning? Review Essay: Scott Soames, *What is Meaning?*" *Philosophia*, 40 (4):885-901 (2012).
45. "Introduction: Davidson's Philosophical Project," with E. Lepore, *Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning and the Mental*, ed. G. Preyer, Oxford University Press, 2012.

2011

46. "Donald Davidson," in *Key Thinkers in the Philosophy of Language*, ed. Barry Lee, Continuum Press, 2011.
47. "Triangulation Triangulated," in *Triangulation: from an epistemological point of view*, ed. by Cristina Amoretti and Gerhard Preyer, Ontos, 2011.
48. "Truth and Meaning Redux," with Ernie Lepore, *Philosophical Studies*, 154, 2011: 251-277.

2010

49. "Intuitions and Relativity," *Philosophical Psychology*, 23(4), August 2010: 427-45.
50. "Adverbs of Action and Logical Form," *A Companion to the Philosophy of Action*, ed. Tim O'Connor and Constantine Sandis, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.
51. "Semantics," *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Language Sciences*, ed. Patrick Hogan, April 2010.

2009

52. "Donald Davidson," with Ernie Lepore, in *12 Modern Philosophers*, eds. C. Belshaw and G. Kemp, Blackwell, 2009.
53. "John Searle," *Pragmatics Encyclopedia*, ed. L. Cummings, Routledge, 2009.

2008

54. "Fodor's Challenge to the Classical Computational Theory of Mind," with Susan Schneider, *Mind and Language*, 23, 2008: 123-143.

2007

55. *Donald Davidson's Truth-theoretic Semantics*, with Ernie Lepore, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
56. "The Concept of Truth and the Semantics of the Truth Predicate," with Emil Badici, *Inquiry*, 2007, 50(6): 622-638.
57. "Radical Misinterpretation: A Reply to Stoutland," with Ernie Lepore, *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 2007, 15(4): 557-585.
58. "The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First vs. Third Person Approaches," *Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Philosophy and the Empirical*, 2007, 31(1): 128-159.
59. "The Problem with Radical Interpretation: Reply to Simon Evnine and Piers Rawling," Book Symposium on *Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth, Language and Reality*, Florida Philosophical Review, Summer 2007.
60. "The Argument from Normative Autonomy for Collective Agents," *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 2007, 38(3): 410-427.
61. "Collective Intentional Behavior from the Standpoint of Semantics," *Noûs*, 2007, 41(3): 355-393.
62. "The Reality of Language: on the Davidson-Dummett Debate," with Ernie Lepore, in *The Philosophy of Michael Dummett: The Library of Living Philosophers*, Open Court, 2007, pp. 185-214.
63. "Foundations of Social Reality in Collective Intentional Behavior", in *Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts: Essays on John Searle's Social Ontology*, Savas L. Tsohatzidis (editor), Dordrecht: Springer, 2007.
64. "Critical Notice: Donald Davidson, *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective; Problems of Rationality; Language, Truth and History*, *Mind*, 116 (April 2007): pp. 405-416.

2006

65. "Nondeclaratives," with Daniel Boisvert, in *The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Language*, eds. B. Smith and E. Lepore, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 864-892.
66. "Ontology in the Theory of Meaning," with Ernie Lepore, *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 2006, 14(3): 321-331.
67. "Essays on Actions and Events," in *Classics of Western Philosophy: The Twentieth Century: Quine and After*, vol. 5. Dublin: Acumen Press, 2006, pp. 146-165.

68. "Is the aim of perception to provide accurate representations?" in *Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science*, ed. R. Stainton, Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, pp. 259-274.
69. "Introduction," *The Essential Davidson*, with Ernie Lepore, Oxford, 2006, pp. 1-20.

2005

70. *Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth, Language and Reality*, with Ernie Lepore, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
71. Entries on Barry Stroud and Benson Mates in the *Thommes Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers*, 2005.
72. "Belief," entry in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2nd edition, Macmillan, 2005.

2004

73. "Davidson's Objection to Horwich's Minimalism about Truth," *Journal of Philosophy*, 101(8), 2004, pp. 429-437.
74. "Rationality, Language and the Principle of Charity," in *The Oxford Handbook of Rationality*, eds. A. Mele and P. Rawling, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 343-362.
75. "Donald Davidson," *Midwest Studies in Philosophy, The American Philosophers*, 2004, 28: 309-333.

2003

76. *Donald Davidson*, (ed.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
77. "The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview," in *The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind*, eds. T. Warfield and S. Stich, Oxford: Blackwell, 2003, pp. 1-46.
78. "Outline of a Truth Conditional Semantics for Tense," with Ernest Lepore, in *Tense, Time and Reference*, eds. A. Jokic and Q. Smith, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003, pp. 49-105.
79. "Truth and Meaning," with Ernie Lepore, in *Donald Davidson: Contemporary Philosophy in Focus*, ed. K. Ludwig, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 35-63.
80. "Critical Notice: François Recanati, *Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta*," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 66(2) (March 2003): 481-488.
81. "Review Essay: John Campbell, *Reference and Consciousness*," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. 66(2) (March 2003): pp. 481-488.
82. "Paul Pietroski, *Causing Actions*," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 81(2) (June 2003): 295-297
83. "Introduction," *Donald Davidson*, ed. K. Ludwig, Cambridge, 2003, pp. 1-34.

2002

84. "Phenomenal Consciousness and Intentionality: Comments on *The Significance of Consciousness*," *Psyche*, 8, 2002.
85. "Vagueness and the Sorites Paradox," with Greg Ray, *Philosophical Perspectives: Mind & Language* 16, 2002, pp. 419-461.
86. "What is Logical Form?" with Ernest Lepore, *Logical Form and Language*, eds. G. Preyer and Georg Peter, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 54-90.

2001

87. "What is the role of a truth theory in a meaning theory?" in *Truth and Meaning: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy*, Seven Bridge Press, 2001, pp. 142-163.

2000

88. "The Semantics and Pragmatics of Complex Demonstratives," with Ernest Lepore, *Mind* 109 (April 2000): 199-240.

1999

89. "Meaning, Truth and Interpretation," in *Discussions with Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning and Knowledge*, ed. Ursula Zeglen, Routledge, 1999, pp. 27-46.
90. "Critical Notice: Ron McClamrock, *Existential Cognition*," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 59(2) (1999): 537-541.
91. "Introduction to Reading Davidson," with Ursula Zeglen, in *Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth and Knowledge*, ed. Ursula Zeglen, Routledge, 1999: 1-13.

1998

92. "Functionalism, Causation and Causal Relevance," *Psyche* 4(3) March 1998.
93. "Semantics for Opaque Contexts," with Greg Ray, *Philosophical Perspectives*, 12, *Language, Mind and Ontology* (1998): 141-166.
94. "Critical Notice: Georges Rey, *Contemporary Philosophy of Mind*," *Mind* 107(425) (January 1998): 246-250.

1997

95. "The Truth about Moods," in *Protosociology, Cognitive Semantics I: Conceptions of Meaning*, 10, (1997): 19-66. Reprinted in *Concepts of Meaning: Framing an Integrated Theory of Linguistic Behavior*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003.

1996

96. "Explaining Why Things Look the Way They Do," in *Perception, Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science*, v. 5, ed. by Kathleen Akins, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1996): 18-60.
97. "Duplicating Thoughts," *Mind & Language* 11 (March 1996): 92-102.
98. "Singular Thought and the Cartesian Theory of Mind," *Noûs* 30(4) (1996): 434-460.

1995

99. "Shape Properties and Perception," in *Perception, Philosophical Issues*, v. 6, ed. Enrique Villanueva, Ridgeview (1995): 325-350.
100. "Why the difference between Quantum and Classical Mechanics is Irrelevant to the Mind Body Problem," *Psyche* 2(5) (October 1995).

1994

101. "First Person Knowledge and Authority," in *Language, Mind, & Epistemology: On Donald Davidson's Philosophy*, eds. Gerhard Preyer, Frank Siebelt, Alexander Ulfig, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994, pp. 367-398.
102. "Are There More than Minimal A Priori Constraints on Irrationality?" with John Biro, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 72(1) (March 1994): 89-102.
103. "Causal Relevance and Thought Content," *Philosophical Quarterly* 44 (July 1994): 334-353.
104. "Dretske on Explaining Behavior," *Acta Analytica* 8(11) (1994): 111-124.
105. "Blueprint for a Science of Mind: A Critical Notice of Christopher Peacocke's *A Study of Concepts*," *Mind & Language* 9(4) (Dec. 1994): 469-491.

1993

106. "Trying the Impossible: Reply to Adams," *Discipline Filosofiche* 2 (Fall 1993): 213-226 (in Italian); published in English in *The Journal of Philosophical Research* XX (1995): 563-570.
107. "A Dilemma for Searle's Argument for the Connection Principle," continuing commentary in *The Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 16 (March 1993): 194-195.
108. "Direct Reference in Thought and Speech," *Communication and Cognition* 26 (1993): 49-76.
109. "Is Content Holism Incoherent?" in *Holism: a consumer's update*, special issue of *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, ed. by Ernest Lepore, 46 (1993): 173-195.
110. "Externalism, Naturalism, and Method," in *Naturalism and Normativity, Philosophical Issues*, v. 4, ed. Enrique Villaneuva, Ridgeview, 1993, pp. 250-264.

1992

111. "Skepticism and Interpretation," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 52 (June 1992): 317-340.
112. "Impossible Doings," *Philosophical Studies* 65 (March 1992): 257-281.
113. "Brains in a Vat, Subjectivity, and the Causal Theory of Reference," *The Journal of Philosophical Research* XVII (1992): 313-345.